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INTRODUCTION

n Liberalism and American Constitutional Law, political scientist
Rogers Smith argues that judges and legal scholars should reorient constitutional decision making and constitutional theory
around an ideal of rational liberty. He contends that this ideal has
been central to our nation's liberal tradition and that it will continue to furnish our most compelling jurisprudential guide. As
stated on the book jacket, Smith "considers and discards the major modern theories in political philosophy that bear on constitftional law: the democratic relativism of Alexander Bickel and
John Hart Ely, the higher-law views inherited from America's religious traditions, and the neo-Kantian liberalism of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls." In their place he proposes an approach derived from "America's original liberalism," which, he says, "has
proven a restless corpse" (p. 2). Smith asserts that his approach
"can respond to the basic philosophic dilemmas of American liberalism" more adequately than alternative approaches centering
on values of democracy, egalitarian justice, or republican virtue,
and that it offers "more practical guidance for contemporary
American law" in areas of due process, freedom of speech, voting
apportionment, and economic welfare (p. 5).
Although many of Smith's claims are not sustained in the
*Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York
at Buffalo; J.D., Harvard University, 1980; Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley,
1976; M.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1972; A.B., Stanford University, 1970.
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book, I find his basic endeavor attractive in one respect. A truly
serious attempt to fashion a meaningful concept of "rational liberty" and apply it to legal outcomes could prove valuable. It
might serve as a catalyst for those seeking a way out of the current
miasma that aligns prevailing debate between shallow apologetics
on the one side and reflexive, almost sophist-like negativity on the
other.
Unfortunately, when Smith sets out to impute substance to
the rational liberty concept, he virtually abandons all efforts at intellectual consistency and treats the concept in an ad hoc manner.
This undercuts his own potentially valuable project and gives one
cause to doubt the seriousness of his efforts in applying political
theory. He invites us to follow him on a long march toward discerning the practical meaning of rational liberty in the contemporary United States, but he rather quickly wraps his ankles in a
burlap bag, leading us to wonder whether he will be going on the
long march at all and, if so, how far.
Smith's failure emanates from his admittedly ambivalent commitment to the overly ambitious and ultimately impossible tasks of
modern-day legal formalism. He attempts to use political theory
to generate a new political consensus sufficiently specific in its prescriptions that it will allow us to deduce "correct" legal outcomes.
This is an old dream in quest of which many competent legal
minds have foundered and partially decomposed. Smith's apparently naive embrace of the dream will make his book seem curiously anachronistic to contemporary legal scholars who, for the
most part, understand that neither political theory nor legal
precedents can free courts from having to make substantive and
controversial political decisions when they articulate constitutional
norms. Political theory's contribution consists more of helping to
organize political commitment than of providing ways of transcending it with consensual legalism. Smith's failure to grasp this
point lures him into a dilemma. He wants his rational liberty approach to be both outcome-determinative and above controversy.
But, to the extent it accomplishes the former, it precludes the latter. Thus, Smith condemns himself to an endless equivocation.
For example, he writes: "Until a seer produces genuinely incontrovertible precepts, no position can do more than suggest guides
for the judgments of governors and citizens. The rational liberty
view acknowledges this fact and claims only to direct the proper
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decisionmakers to the proper questions" (p. 226). At the same
time, however, rational liberty for Smith "leads to determinate
tests that direct judges to consider concretely how [its] goal may
be most fully realized through the issue and circumstances of the
case at hand" (p. 230).
Although ambivalent about his pursuit of the formalist
dream, Smith maintains the pursuit enough to suffer substantial
deleterious effects. These include a type of decay of mental process (known as "thought rot" in the vernacular) in which philosophic clarity and analytic power are sacrificed for the sake of
maintaining the appearance of consistency with an array of legal
decisions. Seeking to maintain such an appearance impels a series
of shifting uses of the rational liberty concept and precludes
Smith from ever setting forth a fixed definition of it. The overall
effect is a decomposition of what could, if better developed, be a
powerful, critical concept for assessing many aspects of our current legal order. By trying to make the rational liberty concept
appear sufficiently neutral, Smith deprives it of the opportunity to
become meaningful.
If political theory concepts are to be more than after-the-fact
justifications for existing patterns of legal results, then they should
be treated as critical standards. Theorists should work to articulate substantial meaning for concepts independent of the legal results they support and should use this meaning as a reference
point for criticizing results. This meaning should be derived from
the scholar's diagnosis of major problems facing his or her society.
Based on this diagnosis, the scholar should attempt to devise concepts that will address the societal problems.
Because I believe that our society's gravest problem is the escalating threat of nuclear annihilation caused by society's continued adherence to obsolete institutions of militaristic nationalism, I
propose defining rational liberty as a process of structuring societal institutions to enhance the public's capacity to develop internationalist, antimilitaristic forms of political consciousness. When
one uses a concept like rational liberty as a critical standard, one's
first duty should be to make the concept become increasingly
meaningful to an increasing number of people. The concept
should be fashioned into a lens through which people can look to
elucidate significant portions of their experience; thus, the concept is imbued with an emotive power-the power of ideology.
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Smith, however, does little to make the rational liberty concept meaningful. His first concern appears to be to demonstrate
the concept's consistency with Warren Court precedents that are
esteemed in polite liberal opinion. This seems to be his way of
trying to make the concept appear capable of determining legal
outcomes without being controversial. Indeed, he is quite explicit
about his abhorrence of controversy; he concludes that "constitutional interpretations should focus on [the] areas of partial agreement [among philosophical approaches] while discreetly obscuring, rather than highlighting, the underlying differences" (p.
228).
Because Smith dreams of articulating a new political consensus and fears to say anything that might jeopardize it, he offers
only the smallest fragment of a definition of rational liberty. He
equates it with conscious, deliberative mental processes but does
not take the next step of asking what any true political theorist
must ask: Toward what ends should the deliberative processes be
extended and why? Without taking this step, no substantial definition of the concept is possible.
In its most abstract form, rational liberty is a contested concept. It is an invitation to set forth competing political visions of
how .society should be organized and how individuals ought to act
to facilitate such organization. Attempts to give the concept substance should have two attributes. They should be plausible, in
light of the concept's intuitive meaning and our known historical
circumstances, and they should be controversial. Controversy is a
sign not of intellectual failure but of there being something important at stake. When thought is both rational and controversial,
then it is likely that the indispensable processes of human mental
adaptation are at work.
Certainly, courts have the task of settling disputes, and the
obscuring of controversy sometimes contributes to this. But if constitutional theorists are to earn their keep, they must think intelligently about how society ought to be governed. As a general rule,
obscurantism and intelligence do not go hand in hand. Thus, a
quest for illusory unanimity is not what is needed. Such a quest
will tend to discourage serious dialogue, replacing it not with analytically correct legal outcomes but with the type of meaningless,
meandering academic discourse that the impolite call "thought
rot."
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Nevertheless, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law may
turn out to be a significant contribution, provided others now take
the rational liberty concept beyond Smith's limited, faltering usage of it. In the remainder of this review, I will identify the book's
positive contributions and further elaborate on how Smith's commitment to formalism undercuts his efforts. I will also attempt to
set forth a more substantial and controversial definition of rational liberty-one that is grounded in a political stance that may
be characterized as "Darwinian internationalism." The review will
conclude by exploring some of the difficulties of that position.
Although Smith has written no tour de force, his book is valuable for three reasons. First, he puts forward, albeit rather
meekly, the very defensible proposition that legal scholars and
other architects of the social system should take philosophical concepts seriously and accord them sufficient meaning that preferred
social consequences may be derived from them. His overall plan in
the book is premised on rational liberty being construed as a critical standard, the understanding of which can tell us how we ought
to live and how courts ought to decide cases.
Second, his choice of concepts is sound. Rational liberty can
be fashioned into a concept that will go to the heart of our current predicament; it is a concept worth trying to expand. Even
though no lensmaker himself, Smith gives us the right raw materials with which to fashion a powerful lens.
Third, he demonstrates how the concept of rational liberty is
rooted in the philosophical and political traditions that accompanied and inspired the founding of the United States. In so doing
he gives rational liberty some pedigree within the American patriotic tradition. Although such a project might seem superfluous, it
can be of value in a time when a politically powerful right wing
both highlights patriotic rhetoric and uses it for socially destructive ends characterizable as both substantively irrational and contrary to liberty. To the extent that cravings for Americanism can
be sublimated into a desire for rational liberty, we improve our
chances of successfully controlling those aggressive impulses
cloaked in patriotism which were once arguably heroic but have
now become certifiably suicidal. The patriotic pedigree of rational
liberty is of some interest, and Smith's discussion on pages thirteen through fifty-nine of his book may be useful for people who
wish to expand the role of rationality in contemporary American
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political culture.
The above discussion may sound like faint praise, but, in actuality, each of these achievements is sufficiently important that
their cumulative effect makes the book a worthwhile entry, notwithstanding its many pronounced defects. Because more can be
learned by contemplating the book's shortcomings, the remainder
of this review will have a slightly acidic character.
The importance of Smith's three achievements stems from
the particular historical circumstances in which we find ourselves
today. We live in the midst of a great melodrama, although many
are unable to see it because our received political/intellectual traditions of corporate conservatism and social-democratic liberalism
poorly prepare us for what is now emerging as the principal political imperative of the age-the creation of a world federal system
and the absorption of the United States into it. I believe that most
serious political thought will lead toward the conclusion that such
a system is necessary for human survival. Insofar as the concept of
rational liberty can become a vehicle for serious political thought,
the concept should grow.
Turning to political theory for guidance is especially apropos
when a nation's political system produces misguided leaders. Condemnations from the World Court, together with their leaders'
disdain for international law and their rapid escalation of the arms
race should have warned the German people in the 1930's that
something was awry. The same signals today should similarly caution the American public.' But such warnings are not easy to heed
in the face of a propaganda apparatus that equates normalcy with
acquiescence, irrespective of the irrationality or monstrous nature
of governmental acts. Thinking about abstract concepts like rational liberty can help to insulate the mind from the numbing effects of propagandistic manipulation.
Before concepts from political theory can offer useful guid1. The Reagan Administration's disdain for international law in general and the decisions of the World Court in particular is plain. For example, in 1985, after a finding of
jurisdiction by the World Court in a suit filed by Nicaragua against the United States, the
Administration announced that it would not subject itself to such jurisdiction. See Contempt
of Court, NATION, Feb. 2, 1985, at 99 ("by withdrawing from the World Court's jurisdic").
tion, the Reagan Administration sent out a signal of contempt for international law.
See generally Quigley, A Frameworkfor Evaluating the Legality of the United States Intervention
in Nicaragua, 17 N.Y.U. J. ILr't L. & PoL 155 (1985) (criticizing United States actions in
Nicaragua litigated before International Court of Justice).
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ance, however, they must be defined. It is in this basic first step
that Smith falters.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION: WHAT IS RATIONAL LIBERTY?

The initial difficulty in defining rational liberty is deciding
whether to view it as a substantive relation of citizens to their political order or merely as a series of exercises in a rational deliberative process. A corollary problem is deciding whether to see it as
an attribute of either the collectivity as a whole or of separate individuals within the collectivity. At most times, Rogers Smith appears to lean toward the individual/deliberative-process model.
He equates rational liberty with "reflective self-direction" (p. 198)
and "the preservation and enhancement of human capacities for
understanding and reflective self-direction" (p. 200). Rational lib-

erty is realized under this model when we engage in "reflective
deliberation on our circumstances and on the various commitments, ideals, desires, opportunities and constraints that those circumstances present to us," and thereby "exercise our critical capacities to consider our possible pursuits" (pp. 200, 201).
Smith focuses on individual mental process in part because he
assumes that there are sufficient information and means for separating the true from the false in our society that rational self-direction is "attainable in appreciable measure by virtually everyone" (p. 201). If such can be assumed for the contemporary
United States, then one wonders whether societies have ever existed where this was not the case and, if so, what distinguishes
those societies from ours. Smith evades such questions because he
wishes to focus on the functioning of individual minds. In essence,
he reduces the problem to one of flicking citizens' individual cognitive selector buttons to "on" so that they may actively engage in
deliberative process. Thus, the capacity for rational self-governance can be presumed regardless of whether people's behavior "is
truly good or wise," so long as the individual engages in "conduct" that is "part of reflective self-direction" (p. 226).

Smith's individual-process definition, which equates rational
liberty with conscious deliberation, is inadequate because history
often tells us that such deliberation can inspire social action that is
grossly irrational in its substantive results. People who remember
the Vietnam era will recall the impeccably conscious deliberative
process of Robert McNamara and his staff. A current analogy
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might be to the convoluted explanations offered in support of a
continuing arms buildup. In another era, one might find a similar
deliberative mental process in the diary of an earnest, young German SS officer who, in the political idioms of his culture and time,
might reflect on the Fuhrer's Rassenhygiene policy as follows:
I must confess, the idea of placing human beings in concentration
camps troubles me, especially when there has been no trial. But then, these
are emergency times. To do this to Jewish people without cause would be
intolerable. But most of what I read in the papers suggests there is ample
cause, that it is largely their treachery that has produced the dire economic
straits in which most Germans now find themselves. Of course, there is no
proof of this, and other theories could be put forward. But we cannot allow
ourselves to be paralyzed indefinitely by uncertainty. We must make judgments. I have sought out all the information available to me, and naturally
the British condemn what our leaders do. But in assessing the mass of data, I
as a German citizen am bound, not to obey unconditionally, but to give due
weight to the expertise and sincerely expressed convictions of my nation's
leaders. I must balance a faith in their conclusions against the reasonable
grounds for skepticism, of which there are some. Certainly, our leaders have
not produced an ideal society, but clearly it is better than living under communism. If they say that Rassenhygiene and internment are necessary to defend our society against subversion, then I should accept the validity of their
pronouncements unless they are refuted beyond a reasonable doubt by contrary evidence. While others choose to see the world differently and to exonerate the Jews, the mere existence of these contrary views is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For everyone to disobey the nation's leaders
merely because they doubt their words or are uncertain would bring chaos
and anarchy. Reason compels me to act accordingly and to support the policies in their present form.

Rational liberty is an attribute not of individuals existing in
isolation or apart from social context but of the whole society. Rational liberty has as prerequisites an informed, intellectually active
citizenry and a benign, relatively nonrepressive state; but these
are only prerequisites. The concept entails a relation between citizens and state such that the ruled are able to make their consent
to governance contingent on the rulers acting in a manner that is
rational and conducive to the general welfare. To have laws that
promote rational liberty is to legislate and adjudicate in ways that
enhance both the government's capacity for rationality and the
citizenry's ability to make their consent contingent on rational
governance. It is to be concerned with the overall flow of information and the organized manipulation of political passions, as
well as with individuals' responses to such inputs. To reduce the
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concept of rational liberty to mere conscious deliberative process-thereby ignoring the very serious problem of "garbage in,
garbage out"-is to impoverish the concept.
Smith does not, however, commit himself wholly to the individual/deliberative process model of rational liberty. He adds two
important caveats. For him, rational liberty is not simply process.
It also contains "a substantive standard, the insistence that we
must strive not to endanger anyone's capacities for such deliberation" (p. 210). He also recognizes that "the concept of rational
liberty offers no fixed and timeless solutions" to constitutional
problems and that "it can be applied only through extensive consideration of the concrete complexities" involved in actual
problems (p. 226).
Though these two caveats are reasonable, Smith fails to grasp
their implications. He does not ask as a matter of definition what
it means, in the context of the late 20th century United States, to
"strive not to endanger anyone's capacities" (p. 210) for rational
self-deliberation. Nor does he identify particular concrete complexities that would give meaning to such a historically specific application of the concept. Thus, he offers no substantive definition
of the concept. At best, he allows his definition to remain so oblique that it fails to illuminate the concept.
This failure underscores the lameness of Smith's efforts to derive specific legal outcomes from the concept of rational liberty.
Illustrative of these is his pronouncement that because "the [rational liberty] theory holds that disregard for the rights of others
is morally wrong, it can support ... punishment 'guided by the
notion of desert'" (p. 233). Smith does not clarify what "rights"
he is talking about. If he means "rights" in a transcendent philosophical or "natural rights" sense, then they would be those rights
that derive from the concept of rational liberty. Because he inadequately defines that concept, however, we must assume that he
means "rights" in the ordinary positivistic sense-that which the
state proclaims as "rights." Then, however, his notion of punishment for violating the rights of others begins to acquire a potentially repressive cast. Soviet Jews who interfere with the "rights"
of government officials by protesting, however quietly, will deserve their punishment, as will antiwar or antinuclear protesters in
this country who interfere with the "rights" of utilities and military personnel. Perhaps Smith favors such punishment-perhaps
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not. But his theory gives him precious little guidance in deciding.
Returning to Smith's better prescription, we should ask: What
are the concrete complexities of life in the United States today
that most directly threaten people's capacities for rational deliberation? Attempting to answer this question can lead us to formulating a substantive definition of rational liberty. It leads me to offer
a Darwinian internationalist vision that forms the basis for my definition of rational liberty.
The United States and the Soviet Union represent the two
surviving entities of a traditional system of governance that has
sustained human life for over 500 years but which appears incapable of sustaining it for more than another century or two. This is
the system of armed, intermittently warring nation states, for
whom war and sovereignty, mass tragedy and battlefield heroism,
arms manufacture and the quest for dominance, are two sides of
the same coin. Because this system has never produced much
more than a century without a major war and because it continues
to generate clear indicia of preparation for such war, it is probable that, unless the system is replaced with a more stable 2 international order based on world federalism, another major war will
occur within decades. Because such a war promises the end of our
civilization and possibly of our species (whose continued existence
is the first prerequisite of rational liberty), avoidance of such a war
and creation of a stable international order define, in our current
historical circumstances, the meaning of rationality. Rational liberty, then, means imbuing the American people with the capacity
to make their consent to governance contingent on governmental
policies that encourage the spread of internationalist sentiment
and reduce the risk of major war. To me-and, I hope, to many
readers-this is the most defensible meaning of rational liberty.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY:

How DOES

RATIONAL

LIBERTY SHAPE LEGAL OUTCOMES?

The indeterminacy of legal doctrine has bedeviled most constitutional theorists and, not surprisingly, it is at the heart of Rogers Smith's difficulties. He, like the theorists whose work he dis2. The term "stable" is not intended to connote the elimination of all political conflict
or even necessarily of all war, but merely the containment of such conflict within levels that
do not threaten the continued existence of the international political order itself.
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cards, feels compelled to offer a means of curbing judicial excesses
by positing a conceptual determinism. He writes: "Thus, the rational liberty approach would not grant to the Court any authority that it does not already exercise. Instead, it would limit potential abuses of that authority by providing a more detailed and
appropriate theory of the basic liberties that can be protected
under due process" (p. 239).
However, there are good reasons why ideals abstracted from
their political contexts will not determine case outcomes. First, insofar as ideals are kept in their pure contested form, they cannot
determine anything. Final scores are not determined by the invitation to play a game but by the outcome of the game itself. Second,
even when ideals acquire deterministic capacity by serving as focal
points for political visions that can define legal outcomes, the actual outcomes, chosen by governmental bodies such as courts, are
not likely to replicate the vision's prescriptions in pure form.
There remains a necessary zone of political discretion as a result
of government's continuing need to harmonize and ensure coexistence of conflicting forces.
The political visions represented by embodied ideals may become forces in the society if they animate powerful social movements, but such movements and forces will still be only one input
into a legal decisional process that is always beset by inertia and
other powerful forms of input. To pretend that ideals of liberalism supplant judicial discretion is to ignore the legal system's a
priori commitment to dispute resolution, system maintenance, and
political stabilization, which shapes outcomes more than any ideal
does. Legal reasoning that is indeterminate in the abstract acquires a determinate tilt when it is used to maintain social stability
in the midst of historical circumstances that have displayed substantial continuity over time. Ideals are important, not for shaping
outcomes directly by legal analysis, but for legitimizing and delegitimizing social movements that furnish inputs into the nation's
governance which is exercised in a coordinated fashion by executive, legislative, judicial, and private corporate branches.
Smith may have some intuitive awareness of all of this. He is
at least uncomfortable with his claim that rational liberty will limit
potential abuses of judicial authority by defining correct outcomes. He claims that rational liberty "leads to determinate tests
that direct judges to consider concretely how [the] goal may be
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most fully realized through the issue and circumstances of the case
at hand" (p. 230). In the same breath, however, he adds that "the
approach does not generate a dogmatic, theory-ridden jurisprudence but instead preserves the possibility of prudential, statesmanlike adjudication" in which judges are free to choose "rules
framed somewhat differently from those suggested here" as long
as they are consistent with "the general characteristics and consequences a rational liberty approach would present" (p. 230).
However, if an ideal does not have an articulated political vision attached to it-if it does not become, in Smith's words, "dogmatic, theory-ridden jurisprudence" (p. 230)-then why bother
with it at all? Smith's attempts to derive legal outcomes from his
nondogmatic, "prudential," in other words, inarticulate use of rational liberty quickly degenerate into nearly total indeterminacy
with a seemingly random array of mostly liberal, sometimes conservative, and occasionally radical outcomes.
Most of the indeterminacy of legal doctrine under Smith's
analysis is generated by an interplay between two types of equivocation. One is between using rational liberty as an ultimate standard with specific meaning (which, unfortunately, is not offered
by Smith) and seeing the concept as an amorphous one, in which
case one must rely on "community standards" to define what is
"consistent with and integral to personal rational self-direction"
(p. 238). Any court that wishes to uphold a law using Smith's rational liberty criterion need merely use the second approach and
view the legislature's passage of the law as evidence of the community standards that give meaning to rational liberty (e.g., outlawing homosexuality because it is not integral to rational self-direction in the eyes of most Virginians3 ). Conversely, rational
liberty can be accorded a meaning that transcends particular community standards (e.g., maximizing personal choice so long as no
one is injured or has choice curtailed), in which case the law will
be struck down.
The second equivocation consists of Smith's use of converse
3. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affg mem. 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (in upholding Virginia statute banning sodomy, district court held state's historic and rational interest in proscribing private
consensual homosexual activity is constitutionally appropriate promotion of morality and
decency); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults held constitutional), reh'g denied 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986).
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approaches in deciding when constitutional protection is necessary
or permissible. On the one hand, he states:
Certain types of activities are so widely thought to be integral to the rational
self-guidance of most persons in American society that they should be considered to evoke strict scrutiny automatically, unless the state can show that
they are actually peripheral in the case of the person claiming due process
protection (p. 237).

In other words, if an activity is "integral to rational self-guidance," then courts must protect it, unless the activity is demonstrably unimportant (p. 237). However, Smith also writes:
Because truly democratic processes are difficult to establish, because democratic majorities may pursue improper ends, and because the system is ultimately concerned to preserve the capacities for rational self-direction of all,
there is justification for intervention by the relatively insulated judiciary
when the community has unnecessarily infringed on conduct generally conceded to be essential to the rational self-governance of some persons. Barring such extreme instances, changes in disliked policies must be sought
through the electoral branches (p. 236).

In other words, unless an activity is "essential to rational selfgovernance" (p. 236), courts may not protect it. Given Smith's
failure to define the words "rational," "essential," "integral,"
"self-governance," and "self-guidance," it is plausible that a wide
range of behavior could be characterized as "integral to rational
self-guidance," on the one hand but not "essential to rational selfgovernance" on the other. For this wide but undefined range of
behavior Smith's approach seemingly would direct courts to reach
opposite results simultaneously.
The range of possible meanings of "rational liberty" is further broadened by Smith when he writes: "The rational liberty
criteria for ranking interests as fundamental involve consideration
not only of whether the activities in question are directly essential
to maintaining personal cognitive capacities but also of whether
they are basic to the legitimate course

. . .

a person has chosen"

(p. 237).
In other words, courts are left free to decide first whether an
activity is "legitimate" and, if it is, to decide whether it is constitutionally protected because it is legitimate or unprotected because
it is not essential, even though legitimate. In the face of such indeterminacy, it is curious that Smith criticizes other forms of rhetoric for fostering "judicial arbitrariness" (p. 236).
Smith attempts to make his approach appear determinate by
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deriving a number of legal outcomes from it. One suspects, however, that the rational liberty approach is not the true source of
his derivations. Rather, he appears to choose topics with established convention and popular opinion so settled that the "correct" outcome appears obvious; hence, it also appears to be an
obvious derivation from the concept of rational liberty. For example, regarding criminal procedure issues, his approach lacks any
method for distinguishing between the Warren Court's due process model and the somewhat contrary approach followed by the
Burger Court. Smith evades this problem by mischaracterizing the
Burger Court's decisions as a total abandonment of due process.
He then forthrightly concludes that rational liberty favors law enforcement with due process over law enforcement without it (pp.
230-33).
Smith's rational liberty approach bars states from prohibiting
marriage but allows them more leeway for curtailing a policeman's desire to have long hair (pp. 237-39). He does not address
relatively difficult borderline legal issues such as sodomy.
With regard to the constitutionality of states spending more
on public education for children of the wealthy than for children
of the poor, Smith asserts that the matter should depend on
whether "the funding system allows adequate training for all";
but he does not attempt to define "adequate training" (p. 257).
The middle section of Liberalism and American Constitutional
Law consists of a breezy 150-year history of law in four areas:
freedom of speech, due process, voting apportionment, and economic welfare. This section is beset by the same contradiction that
racks the book's concluding chapters. Smith asserts that particular
decisional outcomes will flow inexorably from the choice of one or
another philosophic theory. He promises to "evaluate those theories in terms not only of their philosophic potency but also of
their concrete results" (p. 9). This promise is left unfulfilled, however; his categorization of philosophic theories explains nothing.
They range from the inaccurate, such as the Warren Court's ostensibly "near absolute libertarian and egalitarian principles" (p.
65) to the amorphous, such as the Burger Court's "more deferential and decidedly more conservative democratic relativism" (p.
65). This stands in opposition to the critical legal studies movement's "radical, postliberal conception of freedom" (p. 7).
Smith's anemic categories mar his treatment of the first
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amendment free speech guarantee. This is unfortunate because
that area of law, more than any other, raises questions that would
push a serious thinker to consider the meaning of rational liberty.
The issue of regulating private electoral campaign expenditures,
which Smith discusses, highlights uncertainties about the proper
relations between citizens and state and between state and corporate power. All this is at the heart of rational liberty, however
defined. The concept cries out for application, but Smith does not
venture forth. Instead, he merely speculates that the Burger
Court's decisions protecting electoral expenditures may be "explicable in terms of its general relativism, which arguably requires
that it give full First Amendment protection equally to all communication" (p. 114). Of course, there have been many losing first
amendment plaintiffs who did not have the good fortune to fall
under the umbrella of "general relativism." Fortunately for
Smith, the "general relativism" concept has an unflappable elusiveness which guarantees that any statement combining it with
the word "arguably" will be a safe one.
Smith's evaluation of the Burger Court's free speech doctrine
concludes with a moment of relative clarity in which he notes that
the doctrine is "widely perceived as internally confused and substantively inadequate" and calls for "a stronger guiding theory"
(p. 119). In the book's final chapter, "rational liberty" auditions
for this role, but the performance is unconvincing. True to his
own internal confusion, Smith sticks close to the Burger Court in
the outcomes he derives: "Overall, the rational liberty view suggests standards for the scope of freedom of speech that do not
depart radically from current protections" (p. 248).
Not all of Smith's first amendment ideas are harmless, however. His application of rational liberty shows considerable potential as a Trojan horse for political repression. Although some of
his specific applications are simply banal-for example, he would
allow Nazis to amplify their propaganda because it is "cognitive"
but would prohibit the wearing of swastikas because they are
"noncognitive"-at other times his approach seems ominous.
Thus, he eschews "absolutist positions" and states that, while his
view "calls for considerable democracy, it does so only as a means
to realize deliberative self-guidance for the community as a whole,
and insofar as certain types of even public speech jeopardize instead of furthering this goal, they can in principle be restrained"
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(p. 240).
Hence, his approach "does not value modes of expression
that are antithetical to respect and promotion of rational liberty
for all," rather, a "lower tier" of scrutiny is appropriate (pp. 24041) for noncognitive expression "which in substance conveys an
emotive message that has no value or is actually immoral in terms
of rational liberty standards" (p. 242). Smith acknowledges that
his "proposed test no doubt will raise fears of repression" (p. 244)
but he proposes to deal with these fears by means of a verbal panacea: "the dangerous emotive message must be overwhelmingly
preponderant in the communication" (p. 244).
Imagine twenty years hence, when the current crop of Reagan-appointed Federal judges are doddering but still on the
bench. First amendment defenses are raised in the political persecution trials of students and clergy who have counseled draft resistance and treasonously aided "communist" insurrections in Mexico and Guatemala. The judges know deep in their conservative
hearts that communism is the antithesis of "deliberative self-guidance," that to undermine the morale of free-world forces is "immoral" and a "dangerous emotive message" to boot. Before convicting and sentencing, however, they must ask themselves one
question on which the continued vitality of the first amendment
depends: Was the dangerous emotive message overwhelmingly
preponderant in the communication? In the midst of war-induced
hysteria, when threats of repression are greatest, can one imagine
judges saying that "the treason was present, but not preponderant"? Fringe liberal judges who grasp the fine points of Smith's
cognitive/noncognitive distinction might reason that droning
speeches about intervention and morality would be protected, but
what about burning a draft card, chanting antiwar slogans, or
wearing a red armband? Five years for each of those.
The nice thing about the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity is that it has an aspect that is relatively easy to apply: there
has to be graphic depiction of unclothed erogenous zones. Under
this definition, hardly any political speech can be called obscene.
Smith discards this simple boundary because it does not spring out
of the rational liberty concept. He expands the concept so that it
applies not only to graphic sexuality but to "some [unspecifiedl]
glamorizations of nonsexual violence" (p. 244) for which he would
rule out constitutional protection:
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A constitutional standard for punishable obscene and offensive speech reflecting rational liberty purposes therefore might require that "the predominant theme of the materials, taken as a whole, is to render emotionally appealing conduct which overwhelmingly denies or disregards the capacities
for rational self-direction of some persons or classes of persons" (p. 244).

This has me worried. If I say what I really feel about the United
States Congress' decision to use my tax dollars to subsidize assassins in Nicaragua, my utterances will be partly "cognitive" and
partly "noncognitive," and guaranteed to be offensive to at least
five members of the Supreme Court. If I say what I think people
ought to do about this, then I fear that I will "render emotionally
appealing conduct which overwhelmingly denies or disregards the
capacities for rational self-direction of some persons or classes of
persons" (p. 244), namely the ninety-ninth Congress of the United
States. While I do not believe that any legal doctrine can protect
me from the ravages of Congress when its emotions get out of
hand, I think that some types of doctrine are more easily collapsible than others, and that in borderline circumstances it may make
a difference. Smith's prescriptions, unfortunately, offer us a free
speech guarantee that is highly collapsible.
IV. THE PLACE OF IDEALS IN LEGAL DISCOURSE
Rogers Smith's difficulties stem from his being politically
timid and intellectually overambitious at the same time. His main
political concern seems to be to avoid the appearance of being
radical. Thus, whenever he puts forth an interesting idea like constitutional rights to welfare assistance and meaningful work (p.
254), he takes no time to explore the idea but quickly follows it
with a "qualification" that "swallows up most of the substantive
implications" (p. 254).
Smith's treatment of critical legal studies is similar. He pauses
briefly to characterize it as "radical" or "postliberal" (p. 7) and
thereafter pays it no heed. He agrees momentarily that there is no
"sharp division between legal and political or ideological discourse" but then seems to grasp none of the implications of this
(p. 7). In the best tradition of American foolhardiness, he sets out
to define a philosophic concept that will remove courts' political
discretion and limit their potential for arbitrariness. Attempting
to make good on this promise prevents him from ever developing
rational liberty into anything worthwhile or compelling. He would
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have done well to heed the words of the apocryphal Supreme
Court Justice who pronounced at a cocktail party: "Sticks and
stones may break my bones, but words cannot contain me."
Smith's apparently naive embrace of formalism prevents him
from realizing that legal doctrine, when viewed abstractly as an
analytical system, always contains contrary possibilities. Its regularity of outcomes is not shaped by the intrinsic meanings of concepts but by the decisions of judges and other lawmakers to engage in an ongoing political conformity. The sources of
conformity are, for the most part, not liberal ideals themselves but
a concern for the stability and legitimacy of the social system.
This, in turn, depends on what is perceived as creating risks of
instability and illegitimacy. Thus, courts will be attentive to concentrations of political and economic power at one end of the social spectrum and to demonstrable capacity for imminent disruption and disaffection at the other. Any use of ideals in articulating
legal outcomes will be filtered through this systemic stabilization
process. It is foolish to think that any determinate ideal could
emerge from that process in anything close to pure form. As for
the formalist dream of articulating ideals that will allow outcomes
to be deduced by a neutral reasoning process, the answer is
clear-don't bother trying.
While reference to ideals may be useful in legal scholarship,
this utility depends on maintaining a distinction between explanatory theories and advocacy. If you asked what role ideals play in
existing legal doctrine, I would answer that they do not shape outcomes but are used by courts to mask conflict and generate an
illusory appearance of consensus. Ideals are bandied about without serious efforts being made to accord them any consistent
meaning. Ideals come to mean different things to different groups
with conflicting interests and thereby bring antagonistic forces together, at least rhetorically. "Equality of opportunity" is such an
ideal; it has no clear meaning but is central to equal protection
and antidiscrimination law. Legal scholars seeking to explain such
an ideal can make valuable contributions by tracing its shifting
meanings as a function of various inputs into the system maintenance or legitimation process.
Ideals have a different purpose when changes in the law are
advocated. They serve as focal points for the articulation of political visions, which are then applied to legal problems as a way of
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deducing what changes should or should not be made. The persuasiveness of the vision attached to the ideal, and in particular its
capacity to encourage social movements that promote it, will determine the strength of the input into the legal system. The advocate's task is to push the vision as far as it can go, not to predict
how far it actually will go. Advocacy of the vision is of course
weakened if the advocate loses track of the difference between
this and explanatory tasks, so that in his trying to mirror existing
patterns of doctrine the vision itself becomes blurred or is never
articulated.
As stated earlier, I believe we should develop a coherent vision of rational liberty, not to explain existing patterns of case
holdings, but to inspire the growth of internationalist social movements that reduce the risk of war. In our current historical circumstances, peace between the superpowers is not a value distinct
from rational liberty; it is the first and most essential prerequisite
of rational liberty. It is only Smith's refusal to offer any substantial
definition of rational liberty that allows him to believe it is a value
distinct from international peace.
The Darwinian internationalism that I advocate sees a continuing struggle for survival where technology triumphs over some
threats to survival in each epoch but, in the process, creates
others. With rapid changes in technology, patterns of social organization quickly become obsolete and irrational. Legal institutions designed to sustain those patterns become unwitting agents
of destruction. Thus, the United States, with its restriction of information flow across national borders, its amplification of nationalistic sentiment, its heavily militarized economy, and its deference
to executive power and secrecy in covert war making, has a strong
societal inertia that continually reproduces a political culture that
keeps the nation (and the world) on the verge of total conflagration. If the legal system operates to coerce and manipulate the
citizenry into making their consent to governance a blank check
for the dominant militaristic forces, then it may be preserving domestic tranquility for the current generations at the expense of
life for all future ones. If so, then the noble experiment of the
American revolution will have devolved into being the instigator
of the solar system's most spectacular mass suicide! The cause of
this devolution will not be any intrinsic defect in the founding
ideas but simply the fact that nature is a cruel force, whose instru-
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ment of greatest cruelty may on occasion be human genius and
technological revolution.
Perhaps this vision strikes a chord with the reader. Perhaps
the reader thinks the reviewer is very strange. Either way, it
should be acknowledged that this vision imbues the concept of rational liberty with a quality of substantiality that is lacking in
Smith's usage. In this vision, rational liberty becomes the process
of adapting to rapid technological change and triumphing in the
struggle for survival. Rational liberty consists of the forms of participation that allow the citizenry to make the much needed adaptations that transform political culture from one which glorifies
militaristic imperialism by the nation state to one which favors secure world order and the eventual relinquishment of national sovereignty toward this end.
This vision recommends that many of our laws be changed in
order to greatly reduce deference to the war-making powers of
the executive branch as well as to discourage conduct that is inconsistent with viewing the world as a single federated order. The
executive should be prohibited from interfering with the positive,
internationalizing aspects of multinational capital and improved
communications technology. For example, if the executive aids or
abets the destruction of overseas property owned by persons having sufficient connection with the United States to claim constitutional rights (e.g., an oil refinery in Angola), and does so without
specific authorization from Congress, then this should be deemed
a taking of property without due process of law and the executive
should be held liable. Likewise, the government should be prohibited from interfering with the flow of ideas to and from other
countries if it could not constitutionally interfere with those same
ideas passing across domestic state lines. If the State Department
attempts to prohibit entry by foreign speakers or interfere with
travel by Americans abroad, then this should also be deemed a
denial of fundamental rights and liberties.
Likewise, the citizenry's capacity to educate itself and to develop internationalist sentiment should be enhanced and protected. First amendment protections against political intimidation
should be strengthened and extended to private employers in order to guard against the types of setbacks that internationalism
suffered during the McCarthy era (and for which we may all
someday pay the price). In considering the types of political par-
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ticipation and protest to be allowed, as well as the permissible severity of sanctions for those to be disallowed, courts should give
due regard to the need for an active citizenry that will check corrupt officials' propensities to rely on national chauvinism to bolster political support.
The capacity of government officials to deceitfully manipulate
the public into consenting to militaristic buildup and war should
be restricted. One way to do this might be to open our courts to
foreign sovereigns who have been unjustly defamed by our government officials. Thus, whenever a United States official makes
false accusations against a foreign power, and does so with actual
knowledge of the statement's falsity or with reckless disregard for
the statement's truth or falsity, then the foreign sovereign should
be able to sue in American courts to recover at least nominal damages and embarrass the deceitful official. One would also want to
limit the use of secrecy for political and manipulative purposes.
Perhaps this could be done by restricting government secrecy to
circumstances where it was either demonstrably essential for intelligence-gathering or where there was a clear and present danger
of the United States mainland being attacked. Citizens whose lives
are endangered by unnecessary military ventures ought to be accorded effective forums to contest the legitimacy of such actions.
The Constitution's free-speech guarantee and rules of electoral finance should be redefined to minimize elected officials' dependence on funding that comes, directly or indirectly, from defense contractors. Such dependence heightens the risk of war by
making elected officials prone to accept rationalizations for militarism that justify allegiance to the priorities of defense-sector constituents. Such rationalizations tend to make war a self-fulfilling
prophecy. As soon as the nation has a president and Congress sufficiently aware of these problems, attempts should be made to implement a system of public electoral finance coupled with restriction of private expenditures. If the Supreme Court strikes down
such legislation as violative of the first amendment, then Congress
should consider expanding the number of sitting Justices to fifteen. The gravity of the evil of nuclear war, discounted by its improbability, outweighs the loss of institutional prestige that such a
move would inflict on the high Court.
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CONCLUSION

The above discussion gives some sense of how an internationalist would invoke the concept of rational liberty to organize
plans for law reform. Other political visions might advocate different uses of the concept. The danger to avoid is that of an unwarranted exclusivism which assumes that, because one vision or use
seems plausible or true, others must therefore be wrong. Rational
liberty is a contested concept, and the contest will be most fruitful
if the different contestants fully develop their entries.
On this point, Rogers Smith has it exactly backwards. He
does little to develop his own conception of rational liberty but
proposes that it supplant everything else. In particular, he seeks to
purge the right to privacy from constitutional discourse and to replace it with rational liberty. Assuming that he has not written the
book with a secret agenda, such as to eliminate the right to abortion, this is a fallacy. Different social movements succeed in getting their programs and demands enshrined in the constitution
through various sorts of activism and by building alliances with
other groups. Various abstract labels such as "privacy" then furnish rubrics for codifying the group's achievement. One should
not advocate sudden withdrawal of the rubric merely because another rubric was more likely to have been used by the framers of
the constitution. A debate structured around what ought to be the
single guiding constitutional ideal is ill-advised, because such exclusivism could jeopardize the achievements of the numerous social movements.
I will conclude this review by relating a few conversations that
address the formalist's likely concern with the proposed manner
of using ideals. A formalist could be expected to say she was interested in ideals mainly for deriving correct legal outcomes through
an analytical process that was above politics. If the ideals are nothing more than opportunities to articulate political visions, the formalist's preferred use of them is negated. A similar concern is
sometimes expressed within the critical legal studies movement in
language such as: If all ideals are open to diverse interpretations,
why bother to get involved in substantive debates about the meaning of ideals?
To answer this objection, one must first confront the analytical power of the critical legal studies' "indeterminacy of doctrine"
critique and then view critical legal studies' obsessive devotion to
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the critique as an ideological limitation imposed on political consciotisness. This approach can be illustrated by a hypothetical argument between a fictionalized critical legal scholar, Denton
Fiercenik, and a more traditional, also fictionalized legal scholar,
Marvin Hubris.
Fiercenik begins by challenging Hubris to pick any single legal rule that he thinks can be derived from the concept of rational
liberty. Fiercenik then offers to derive the very opposite of the
rule from the same concept and to be at least as convincing in his
derivation. Hubris chooses the well-established first amendment
ban against discrimination on the basis of a speaker's identity or
the content of his message. Fiercenik responds:
Fiercenik: In our law, government is allowed to engage in an
enormous amount of discrimination on the basis of a speaker's
identity or the content of her message, and rational liberty not
only allows this but would be enhanced by more explicit and intentional discrimination.
Hubris: You're being silly, Denton.
Fiercenik: Go ahead and make your argument. Then we'll
see who is silly.
Hubris: Alright. To follow an ideal of rational liberty is to
give everyone the maximum amount of liberty consistent with the
rights of others. Clearly, the government will not try to restrict
the speech of everyone on all topics. If it is required to treat all
ifiessages similarly, then it will be prevented from restricting those
messages that it opposes. The result is to maximize freedom of
speech along the lines suggested by a concept of rational liberty.
Fiercenik: And you feel this is the law in our current society?
Hubris: Don't you?
Fiercenik: No. I think the government discriminates
enormously.
Hubris: How so?
Fiercenik: I have a different message about United States foreign policy than CBS News, but every night their message gets
aired and mine doesn't.
Hubris: That's not because of content-based discrimination.
It's because they happen to own the station and license. You
don't.
Fiercenik: Well, the government chooses to let them keep on
owning the station knowing the kind of messages they put out. If I
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and some other critical legal scholars took over the control room
at CBS News, the government would probably murder us, even
though the content of our messages would probably be better for
the American people to hear. That's discrimination.
Hubris: But it's not discrimination on the basis of the
speaker's identity or message. It's that CBS has more money than
you do.
Fiercenik: When the government chooses to always discriminate in favor of those who have more money, knowing as it does
the type of vacuous, bourgeois, jingoistic content that will be produced as a result, it engages in content discrimination.
Hubris: I don't see it.
Fiercenik: It's content discrimination because the government's actions are causing, at least indirectly, some messages to be
aired less than others. Like peace and love of humanity. When did
you last hear that?
Hubris: Sunday morning in church. You should go
sometime.
Fiercenik: Anyway, it's the government's policy of favoring
the rich that causes the discrimination.
Hubris: This isn't how we see things in constitutional law.
Fiercenik: I don't teach constitutional law. I teach torts. In
torts, if your deliberate actions are having certain bad results
which you have the capacity to prevent, and you choose not to see
the results or to let them happen anyway, then it's your conduct
that is said to have caused the results.
Hubris: So what's your conception of rational liberty? Having a bunch of armed critical legal scholars take over CBS News?
Fiercenik: It's that we should engage in content discrimination more rationally, with more conscious deliberative process, instead of assuming that everything will work out best if the rich are
always left in control.
Hubris: But then there's a tremendous capacity for abuse by
government officials.
Fiercenik: Isn't there always a tremendous capacity for abuse
by government officials?
Hubris: Not with our traditional first amendment principles.
Fiercenik: What about the McCarthy era?
Hubris: That was an exception.
Fiercenik: Don't you believe that, in general, abuses will be
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less severe and more correctable if exposed to the light of reason,
and that we should consciously deliberate on the current forms of
content discrimination instead of pretending that they don't exist?
Hubris: Except that by allowing the government to discriminate, we may get the wrong kinds of discrimination.
Fiercenik: Then isn't the best solution to deliberate on that
too? That is, to include as part of rational liberty not only deliberation of what content should be favored but also of what risks
there are in favoring certain types of messages over others, and
how these are best minimized?
Hubris: That might be true in principle.
Fiercenik: Isn't that what we're talking about here?
Hubris: I don't know, Denton. If I thought you were sincere,
I might be more willing to take you seriously.
Fiercenik: I am sincere-about showing you how it's bullshit
to apply concepts like rational liberty because they can always be
turned upside down.
Hubris:I think you're just demoralizing people with this.
[Hubris made his way back to the bar. There he found, in a
merry but still articulate condition, the noted legal philosopher,
Otto Dunkirk, beaming with his unassailable Cheshire smile.
Hubris mumbled a brief lament which inspired Dunkirk to
comment:]
Dunkirk: Of course Fiercenik's position is wildly incoherent.
That's true of all the critical legal scholars.
Hubris: I agree. It's just not easy to show when you're there
in a room with him.
Dunkirk: Would you like me to do it for you?
Hubris: Yes, I would.
[Dunkirk finished his sherry and sallied forth, Hubris walking
energetically with him, confident that he now had an older
brother who could beat up the arrogant visitor from another
neighborhood. They spotted Fiercenik crouched with one foot on
a table, speaking with a small group of enthralled students.]
Dunkirk: So, Denton, I hear you don't much like CBS.
Fiercenik: No, I don't.
Dunkirk: Are you really planning to have a group of armed
critical legal scholars take over the control room?
Fiercenik: Of course not.
Dunkirk: So you admit that our society is pretty good in
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terms of first amendment concerns.
Fiercenik: No, actually, I don't. I think the ideas that are disseminated and shape political culture in this country are
disastrous.
Dunkirk: Because they're not radical enough for you?
Fiercenik: That, and because they've brought us to the verge
of annihilation.
Dunkirk: Ahal That certainly would not be good. Even Margaret Thatcher opposes that. What in particular is it about the
ideas disseminated that has brought us to this point?
Fiercenik: Americans are manipulated to support a defense
buildup that is bringing us closer to accidental nuclear war and to
support military intervention as long as American ground troops
aren't involved. And they're trained to hate and fear all kinds of
other people.
Dunkirk: And you feel the government is somewhat responsible for this?
Fiercenik: Yes. That's what Hubris and I were discussing.
The government and the people who control the media are
resopnsible.
Dunkirk: Have you been discussing this in your classes, too?
Fiercenik: No, not at all.
Dunkirk: Have you had other legal discussions where it came
up?
Fiercenik: None that I can remember.
Dunkirk: But you think it's an important thing to discuss?
Fiercenik: Yes, obviously.
Dunkirk: What was the occasion that caused you to discuss it
with Professor Hubris?
Fiercenik: We were arguing about the meaning of rational
liberty as applied to law.
Dunkirk: Can we say that arguing about rational liberty is
what caused you to bring it up?
Fiercenik: I guess so.
Dunkirk: And you admit it's a more important topic to address than most of what you call liberal legalism?
Fiercenik: I think I see where you're going.
Dunkirk: So the only people who should say it's bullshit to
apply rational liberty to law are people who feel important topics
like this should not be discussed?
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Fiercenik: Very nice. Good counterpoint. I'll have to remember this.
[I followed Dunkirk out. I admired his ability to focus on the
larger picture and wanted to enlist his participation in future discussions about the meaning of rational liberty. I caught up with
him as he was hailing a taxi.]
Myself: Would it be all right if I ride with you?
Dunkirk: If you want.
Myself: I think you're right in criticizing the lack of substance in Denton's approach.
Dunkirk: Clearly.
illyself' To really give a radical critique of American society
req. ares a substantive commitment to some other sort of political
vision. It's not enough to attack legalism.
Dunkirk: That's why the critical legal studies people are so
incoherent.
Myself' I've been trying to define a concept of rational liberty from an internationalist perspective. I think the work's political orientation is consistent with a lot of your writing.
Dunkirk: Could be. What do you mean, "internationalist
perspective"?
Myself: It's a way of trying to evolve toward a world federalist system. Getting rid of national sovereignty. Would you be interested in reading a short paper?
Dunkirk: I don't think so.
Myself. Why not?
Dunkirk: I don't know. It doesn't sound very legal, and I'm
busy.
Myself. What do you mean?
Dunkirk: It sounds like the enterprise you're proposing
would be rather foreign to our legal system.
[At that point the taxi became snarled in traffic. Dunkirk and
I started to become edgy. For a man of such remarkable composure, he fidgeted a great deal.]
Myself: So?
Dunkirk: I prefer to read things that relate to the legal
system.
Myself. Trying to make it adapt in ways you concede are important-isn't that relating?
Dunkirk: No, to me it sounds more like rejecting the system.
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Myself- It's trying to give some coherent meaning to the concept of rational liberty. What about your book, Taking Ideals
Seriously?
Dunkirk: That doesn't say we should reject the system.
Myself Then why did you say what you did to Fiercenik?
Dunkirk: To show how incoherent he was.
Myself. But this makes you sound incoherent. Didn't you say
it's important to use ideals as a way of discussing the most pressing
political issues?
Dunkirk: It's important from his perspective, because he rejects the system. I don't.
Myself' So, you admit there is a possibility we're moving toward annihilation, and that altering the legal system might slow
this movement, and still you don't think we should even discuss it?
Dunkirk: There are other disciplines that deal with the risk
of annihilation.
Myself- It sounds like you have nothing at stake.
Dunkirk: [checking his watch] Actually, I have a great deal at
stake, and it all depends on my getting to this next appointment
with a publisher. Driver-is there a way we could get out of this
traffic?
I took my cue, got out of the taxi, and wandered through the
city confused. The next morning, I awoke less confused. It appears in retrospect that Hubris, Fiercenik, and Dunkirk all have
something in common. Through various conceptual methods-unexamined legalism, reflexive antilegalism, exclusion of the
alien other-each avoids confronting the overwhelmingly important issue of impending annihilation and tries to fashion his politics within a more sheltered artificial world that takes society's continued existence for granted. This is typical of our culture and
hard to attack. But it is also maladaptive in the Darwinian struggle
for survival. Humans, and especially Americans, who do not now
use their cognitive powers to address the problem are like birds
with oil on their wings.
Contemporary liberalism is paralyzed by three powerful logics. There is the logic of nationalism, which compels that elected
national leadership be respected and followed, particularly in foreign affairs, no matter how vicious or insane the policies. There is
the logic of capital, which has internationalized before everyone
else and become correspondingly more powerful. There is the
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logic of majoritarianism, much revered by legal scholars, which, in
contemporary context, says: He who is powerful enough to censor
the news, to buy the politicians and advertisers, and to manipulate
the poorly educated, confused, largely apolitical populace shall
have his agenda equated with reason and with the will of the
people.
The three logics are powerful, and it is unsurprising that
Rogers Smith chooses not to take them on. The Darwinian struggle for survival persists, however, and it is difficult to portray our
role in it flatteringly. With significantly more freedom than our
Soviet counterparts, we have done a significantly worse job of
holding our collective death instinct in check. We have allowed
our political system to fall into great disrepair and have strayed
far from the concept of rational liberty that guided our nation's
founders. I believe that history will judge us harshly. But, then
again, who is history to judge? It may be as mortal and short-lived
as we are.

